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Attack-Resilient Distributed Algorithms for Exponential Nash Equilibrium Seeking
Zhi Feng and Guoqiang Hu
Abstract—This paper investigates a resilient distributed Nash equi-
librium (NE) seeking problem on a directed communication network
subject to malicious cyber-attacks. The considered attacks, named as
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, are allowed to occur aperiodically,
which refers to interruptions of communication channels carried out
by intelligent adversaries. In such an insecure network environment,
the existence of cyber-attacks may result in undesirable performance
degradations or even the failures of distributed algorithm to seek the
NE of noncooperative games. Hence, the aforementioned setting can
improve the practical relevance of the problem to be addressed and
meanwhile, it poses some technical challenges to the distributed algo-
rithm design and exponential convergence analysis. In contrast to the
existing distributed NE seeking results over a prefect communication
network, an attack-resilient distributed algorithm is presented such
that the NE can be exactly reached with an exponential convergence
rate in the presence of DoS attacks. Inspired by the previous works in
[21]–[26], an explicit analysis of the attack frequency and duration is
investigated to enable exponential NE seeking with resilience against
attacks. Examples and numerical simulation results are given to show
the effectiveness of the proposed design.
Index Terms—Distributed algorithm, NE seeking, Directed graph,
Exponential convergence, Cyber-attack, Resilience.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking of non-
cooperative games has been attracting increasingly attention due
to its broad applications in multi-robot systems [1], mobile sensor
networks [3], smart grids [5], and so on. In contrast to early works
(e.g., [2], [4], [6]) with a complete information setting, players in
distributed NE seeking have limited local information, i.e., each
player needs to make the decision based on the local or relative
information, e.g., information from its neighbors, to optimize its
own objective function. Thus, the players involved in the game
are required to communicate with each other over the network to
estimate other players’ actions.
Literature review: various distributed continuous- and discrete-
time algorithms are developed in [8]–[18] to solve distributed NE
seeking problems in games, in which each player cannot observe
all other players’ actions, but can exchange information between
neighbors over an undirected graph or weight-balanced digraph.
Gradient-based NE seeking algorithms are popular techniques to
find the NE of games with differentiable objective functions where
each player modifies its current action based on the gradient with
respect to its own action. The distributed NE seeking issue with
continuous-time agent dynamics is studied in [8]–[14]. In partic-
ular, distributed NE seeking strategies are proposed in [8] and [9]
by combining the leader-follower based consensus algorithms and
gradient-play strategies over an undirected and connected graph.
The authors in [11] exploit some incremental passivity properties
of pseudo-gradients to illustrate that the estimates of the proposed
augmented gradient dynamics converge to the NE exponentially
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under the graph coupling condition. To remove this condition, the
two time-scale singular perturbation analysis is further developed.
Distributed NE seeking of aggregative games has been studied in
[12]–[14], where each player’ objective function relies on its own
action and an aggregate of all players’ actions. On the other hand,
discrete-time consensus algorithms are presented in [15] to search
for the NE of congestion games, where each player has the linear
cost function. In [16], the gossip-based algorithm is developed to
seek the NE. An alternating direction method of multipliers’ algo-
rithm with the constant step-size is proposed in [17] by exploiting
the convex and smooth properties of pseudogradients. Recently,
[18] adopts consensus-based gradient-free NE seeking algorithms
for limited cost function knowledge. Distributed algorithms via
diminishing and constant step-sizes are studied, where the former
ensures an almost sure NE convergence, while the latter provides
convergence to the neighborhood of the NE.
One observation in distributed NE seeking problems is that all
players require to find the NE via information exchange between
neighbors through a communication network. Unfortunately, due
to malicious cyber-attacks such as DoS attacks, deception attacks
(false data injection, replay attack), disclosure attacks [20]–[30],
the secure network environment is hardly guaranteed in practice.
The network security plays a fundamental yet critical role in suc-
cessful information transmission. The malicious attacks interrupt,
incorrect, or tamper transmitting information so that efficiency of
distributed NE seeking algorithms is degraded significantly, and it
might even lead to the failure of seeking the NE under malicious
attacks. In light of wide applications of distributed algorithms in
cyber-physical systems (safety-critical), and inspired by studies of
security issues in many existing works (e.g., see [20]–[30]), it is
highly desirable to determine how resilient distributed NE seeking
algorithms will be against malicious attacks based on the fact that
distributed algorithms are easily disrupted by malicious behaviors.
Thus, the main objective of this work is to address attack-resilient
problems of distributed NE seeking so as to provide certain safety
and resilience performances against attacks. So far, few efforts are
made on resilient distributed NE seeking.
This paper focuses on the attack-resilient research of distributed
NE seeking of a non-cooperative game. In particular, an attack-
resilient distributed algorithm is proposed to solve the NE seeking
problem in the multi-player non-cooperative game over a directed
communication network under malicious DoS attacks. The major
contributions of this paper are as follows. Firstly, to the best of
our knowledge, this paper is the first work to solve this issue. The
proposed distributed NE seeking algorithm is capable of exactly
seeking the NE in the presence of DoS attacks. The exponential
convergence of the proposed algorithm is rigorously guaranteed,
provided that the frequency and duration of attacks satisfy certain
bounded conditions. Moreover, compared with existing NE seek-
ing works requiring ideal communication in [8]–[18], we develop
attack-resilient distributed NE seeking algorithms to search for the
2NE in adversarial network environments. The algorithms employ
consensus-based pesudo-gradient strategies with a hybrid system
method to constrain DoS attacks. The explicit analysis is provided
according to the Lyapunov stability. In addition, different from the
distributed convex optimization works in [31]–[33] that consider
faults on nodes and require the removal of their states to be prior
known, this paper investigates the more practical DoS attack on
communication network. The attacks are time-sequence based and
allowed to occur aperiodically. Another contribution of this work
is that unlike results in [8]–[18] and [31]–[33] over an undirected
graph or weight-balanced digraph, the strongly connected directed
graph is allowed here, and in the presence of malicious attacks,
this directed graph can be disrupted or totally paralyzed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II gave mathematical
preliminaries. In Section III, the non-cooperative game and DoS
attack model are described, and the main objective is presented.
The attack-resilient distributed algorithm is proposed in Section
IV, where the NE seeking results with an exponential convergence
analysis are provided. Examples and numerical simulation results
are given in Section V, followed by the conclusion in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
Denote R, Rn, and Rn×m as the sets of the real numbers, real
n-dimensional vectors and real n×m matrices, respectively. De-
note R≥0 as the set of nonnegative numbers, while N+ represents
the set of positive integers. Let 0n (1n) be the n× 1 vector with
all zeros (ones) and In be the identity matrix. Let col(x1, ..., xn)
and diag{a1, ..., an} be a column vector with entries xi and a
diagonal matrix with entries ai, i = 1, 2, · · · , n, respectively.
The symbols ⊗ and ‖·‖ represent the Kronecker product and the
Euclidean norm, respectively. Given a real symmetric matrix M ,
let M > 0 (M ≥ 0) denote that M is positive (or positive semi-
definite), and λmin(M), λmax(M) are its minimum and maximum
eigenvalues, respectively. For a function f , it is said to be Cm if it
is mth continuously differentiable. For two sets X and Y , Y \X
denotes the set of elements belonging to Y, but not to X.
B. Convex analysis
A function f : Rn → R is convex if f(ax+(1−a)y) ≤ af(x)+
(1− a)f(y) for any scalar a ∈ [0, 1] and vectors x, y ∈ Rn. f is
locally Lipschitz on Rn if it is locally Lipschitz at x for ∀x ∈ Rn.
If f is a differentiable function, ▽f denotes the gradient of f . A
vector-valued function (or mapping) F : Rn → Rn is said to be
ιF -Lipschitz continuous if, for any x, y ∈ Rn, ‖F (x)−F (y)‖ ≤
ιF ‖x− y‖. Function F : Rn → Rn is (strictly) monotone if, for
any x, y ∈ Rn, (x − y)T (F (x) − F (y))(>) ≥ 0. Further, F is
a ε-strongly monotone, if for any scalar ε > 0, and x, y ∈ Rn,
(x− y)T (F (x) − F (y)) > ε‖x− y‖2.
C. Graph Theory
Let G¯ =
{
V , E¯
}
denote a directed graph, where V ∈ {1, ..., N}
is a set of nodes and E¯ ⊆ V × V is a set of edges. An edge (i, j) ∈
E¯ denotes that ith agent receives the information from jth agent,
but not vice versa. N¯i =
{
j ∈ V |(j, i) ∈ E¯
}
is a neighborhood
set of the agent i. A directed graph is strongly connected if there
exists a directed path connecting every pair of nodes. The matrix
A¯ = [a¯ij ] denotes the adjacency matrix of G¯, where a¯ij > 0 if
and only if (j, i) ∈ E¯ , else a¯ij = 0. A matrix L¯ = [l¯ij ] ∈ RN×N
is called the Laplacian matrix of G¯, where l¯ii =
∑N
j=1 a¯ij and
l¯ij = −a¯ij , i 6= j. Denote L¯ , D¯ − A¯, where D¯ =
[
d¯ii
]
is the
diagonal matrix with d¯ii =
∑N
j=1 a¯ij . Similarly, let G denote a
weighted digraph, where aij = ωia¯ij for a scalar ωi > 0. With
the same definition of L¯, the Laplacian matrix of this new digraph
becomes L =WL¯, where W = diag{ω1, · · · , ωN}.
Assumption 1: The directed graph G¯ is strongly connected.
Lemma 1: [37] By Assumption 1, the Laplacian matrix L¯ of
G¯ has the following properties.
1) L¯ has a simple zero eigenvalue associated with right eigen-
vector 1N , and nonzero eigenvalues have positive real parts;
2) ω = col(ω1, · · · , ωN ) with ωT 1N = 1 is a left eigenvector
of L¯ associated with the zero eigenvalue. Then, ωT L¯ = 0TN
and minζT x=0, x 6=0 x
T Lˆx
xTx
> λ2(Lˆ)
N
, where Lˆ = 12 (L+ L
T )
and ζ is any vector with positive entries. Moreover, ω = 1N
if and only if G¯ is strongly connected and weight-balanced.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Non-cooperative Game over Networks
In this paper, we consider a multi-agent network consisting of
N players, which form a N-player non-cooperative game defined
as follows. For each agent i ∈ V , the ith player aims to minimize
its cost function Ji(xi, x−i) : Rni → R by choosing its strategy
xi ∈ Rni , and x−i = col(x1, · · · , xi−1, · · · , xN ) is the strategy
profile of the whole strategy profile except for player i. Let x =
(xi, x−i) represent all players’ action profile. Alternatively, let x
= col(x1, · · · , xN ) ∈ Rn, n =
∑
i∈V ni.
The concept of Nash equilibrium is given below.
Definition 1: (Nash equilibrium) A strategy profile x∗ = (x∗i ,
x∗−i) ∈ R
n is said to be an Nash equilibrium of the game if
Ji(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i) ≤ Ji(xi, x
∗
−i), for ∀xi ∈ R
ni , i ∈ V . (1)
Condition (1) means that all players simultaneously take their
own best (feasible) responses at the NE x∗, where no player can
unilaterally decrease its cost by changing its strategy.
Assumption 2: For each player i, Ji(xi, x−i) is C2, strictly
convex, and radially unbounded in xi for each x−i.
Under Assumption 2, it follows from [35] that an NE x∗ exists,
and satisfies ▽iJi(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i) = 0ni , and ▽iJi(xi, x−i) = ∂Ji(xi,
x−i)/∂xi ∈ Rni represents the partial gradient of player i’s cost
with respect to its own action xi. We define
F (x) , col(▽1J1(x1, x−1), · · · ,▽NJN (xN , x−N )), (2)
where F (x) ∈ Rn denotes the pseudo-gradient (the stacked vector
of all players’ partial gradient). Thus, we have F (x∗) = 0n.
Assumption 3: The pesudogradient F is ε-strongly monotone
and ιF -Lipschitz continuous for certain constants ε, ιF > 0.
Remark 1: Assumptions 2 and 3 were widely used in existing
works (e.g., [10]–[18]) to guarantee the unique NE x∗.
In a game with perfect information (a complete communication
graph) requiring the global knowledge on all players’ actions, a
gradient-play algorithm x˙i = −▽iJi(xi, x−i) can be used to seek
the NE asymptotically (Lemma 2, [11]). However, this design is
impractical if the communication network is not complete. Then,
a distributed algorithm is desirable to broadcast the local informa-
tion among players. Unfortunately, when distributed computations
are required and executed over insure communication networks
under cyber-attacks, the exact NE may not be found.
3Fig. 1. An illustration of DoS attacks on communication channels (i, j) occurring
at 2s, 9s, aijms with their durations being 3s, 1s, τ
ij
m s, respectively. Thus, we obtain
Ξ
(i,j)
a (3, 10) = [3, 5) ∪ [9, 10) for just an example.
B. Malicious DoS Attack Model
As studied in the preliminary results [21]–[26], the well-known
DoS attack refers to a class of malicious cyber-attacks where an
attacker aims to corrupt and interrupt certain or all components
of communication channels between the players. Without loss of
generality, we suppose that each adversary follows an independent
attacking strategy with a varying active period. Due to the limited
energy, then it terminates attacking activities and shifts to a sleep
period to supply its energy for next attacks.
To be specific, suppose that there exists an m ∈ N and denote
{aijm}m∈N as an attack sequence when a DoS attack is lunched at
channel (i, j). Let the duration of this attack be τ ijm ≥ 0. Then, the
m-th attack strategy is generated with A
(i,j)
m = aijm ∪ [a
ij
m, a
ij
m +
τ ijm) where a
ij
m+1 > a
ij
m+ τ
ij
m for m ∈ N
+. Given t ≥ t0, the sets
of time instants where communication between (i, j) is denied,
are described in the following form [24]–[26]:
Ξ(i,j)a (t0, t) = (∪
∞
m=1 A
(i,j)
m ) ∩ [t0, t], m ∈ N
+, (3)
which implies that the sets where communication between (i, j) is
allowed, are: Ξ
(i,j)
s (t0, t) = [t0, t] \Ξ
(i,j)
a (t0, t). Then, |Ξa(t0, t)|
= |∪(i,j)∈EΞ
(i,j)
a (t0, t)| is the total length of attacker being active
over [t0, t], while |Ξs(t0, t)| = [t0, t]\|Ξa(t0, t)| denotes the total
length of attacker being sleeping over [t0, t].
Definition 2: (Attack Frequency) For any T2 > T1 ≥ t0, let
Na(T1, T2) denote the total number of DoS attacks over [T1, T2).
Then, Fa(T1, T2) =
Na(T1,T2)
T2−T1 denotes the attack frequency over
[T1, T2) for ∀T2 > T1 ≥ t0, where there exists scalars N0, Tf > 0
so that Na(T1, T2) ≤ N0 + (T2 − T1)/Tf .
Definition 3: (Attack Duration) For any T2 > T1 ≥ t0, denote
|Ξa(T1, T2)| as the total time interval under attacks over [T1, T2).
The attack duration over [T1, T2) is defined as: there exist scalars
T0 ≥ 0, Ta > 1 so that |Ξa(T1, T2)| ≤ T0 + (T2 − T1)/Ta.
Remark 2: As investigated in the pioneer works [21]–[26] for
multi-agent systems under attacks, Definitions 2 and 3 are firstly
introduced in [21] to specify attack signals in terms of frequency
and time-ratio constraints. The m-th DoS attacks occurring at aijm
between communication channels (i, j) with τ ijm are allowed to
occur aperiodically and can interrupt any communication channels
synchronously or asynchronously. Fig. 1 provides an example for
more details. In Definition 2, 1/Tf provides an upper bound on
the average DoS frequency, while 1/Ta in Definition 3 provides
an upper bound on the average DoS duration. It requires attacks
to neither occur at an infinitely fast rate or be always activated.
C. Main Objective
This work aims to study an attack-resilient issue of NE seeking
under an insecure communication network as follows.
Problem 1: (Attack-Resilient Distributed NE Seeking)
Consider a non-cooperative game consisting of N players com-
municating over an insecure communication network induced by
DoS attacks. Design an attack-resilient distributed NE algorithm
so that all players can exactly reach the NE x∗ with an exponential
convergence rate and a resilient feature against attacks.
minimize Ji(xi(t), x−i(t)), xi(t) ∈ Rni , i = 1, · · · , N,
subject to: x˙i(t) = ui(t), t ∈ Ξ
(i,j)
s (t0, t) ∪ Ξ
(i,j)
a (t0, t).
(4)
Remark 3: In contrast to existing works in [8]–[18], solving
Problem 1 is much more challenging at least from the following
aspects: (1) Player communication network: the games involved
in an insecure communication network may lead to the interrup-
tion of communication transmission caused by DoS attacks, which
makes existing NE seeking algorithms [8]–[18] inapplicable. (2)
Assumption: in the absence of attacks, the graph is directed rather
than being an undirected graph or weight-balanced digraph in [8]–
[18]. Further, this digraph under DoS attacks can be disconnected
or totally paralyzed, which brings nontrivial convergence analysis.
(3) Design requirement: propose an attack-resilient distributed NE
seeking scheme with the exponential convergence and resilience
features against attacks. Due to aforementioned challenges, exist-
ing NE seeking algorithms cannot be directly applied.
D. Motivating Example
In order to illustrate the influence of DoS attacks on distributed
NE seeking, the following motivation example is provided. We
consider a classic example in economy, namely the Nash-Cournot
game (e.g., [11], [38]). This game includes some firms involved in
the production of a homogeneous commodity, where the quantity
produced by firm i ∈ V is denoted by xi, and the overall cost
function of each firm i is described by
Ji(xi, x−i) = gi(xi)− xif(x), i ∈ V , (5)
where gi(xi) = ai+bi(xi−ci)+dix2i is the production cost with
ai, bi, ci, di describing the characteristics of firm i, and f(x) =
f0−f1
∑N
j=1 xj is the commodity price with constants f0, f1. As
studied in [11], these parameters are chosen as ai = ci = di = 0,
bi = 10+4(i−1), f0 = 720, and f1 = 1. By certain calculations,
the NE is x∗ = col(110, 106, 102, 98, 94, 90).
Next, we consider the following different cases:
i) in the absence of attacks, the existing distributed NE seeking
algorithm in [11] is performed, and Fig. 2 shows that all players’
strategies can reach consensus and converge to the NE.
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Fig. 2. Simulated results generated by the existing algorithm [11] in the absence
of DoS attacks. Left: plot of players’ strategies and the NE x∗i ; Right: plot of an
undirected graph in [11] and its associated Laplacian matrix.
4ii) in the presence of attacks, this algorithm is further performed
under graphs in Fig. 3(a) and the simulation result is shown in Fig.
3(b). As we see, all players’ strategies neither reach consensus or
converge to the NE. In contrast, the simulation result generated
by the proposed attack-resilient algorithm is shown in 3(c), where
all players’ strategies reach consensus and converge to the NE.
(a) Various graphs under DoS attacks on communication channels
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(b) Algorithm in [11]
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(c) Proposed attack-resilient algorithm
Fig. 3. Simulated results generated by different algorithms under DoS attacks.
IV. ATTACK-RESILIENT DISTRIBUTED NE SEEKING
In distributed NE seeking games, each player i has no access
to the full information of all players’ strategies. Then, each agent
i shall estimate all other players’ strategies. Inspired by [11], let
each player combine its gradient-play dynamics with an auxiliary
dynamics, i.e., implement the following dynamics:{
x˙ii = u
i
i, u
i
i = −▽iJi(x
i
i, x
i
−i) + e
i
i, i ∈ V ,
x˙ij = u
i
j , u
i
j = e
i
j, ∀j ∈ V , j 6= i,
(6)
where player i maintains an estimate vector xi = col(xi1, · · · , x
i
i,
· · · , xiN ) in which x
i
j is player i’s estimate of player j’s action,
xii = xi is the player i’s actual action, x
i
−i is the player i’ estimate
vector without its own action, uii = ui is the player i’s actual
input, uij is the other players’ input, and e
i
i, e
i
j are to be developed.
In (6), each player i updates xii to reduce its own cost function and
updates xij to reach consensus with the other players. In addition,
each player i relies on its local estimated action xi−i.
For each player i, (6) can be rewritten in a compact form
x˙
i = −RTi ▽iJi(x
i) + ei, i ∈ V , (7)
where ei = col(ei1, · · · , e
i
i, · · · , e
i
N) ∈ R
n is a relative estimated
error to be designed, and Ri ∈ Rni×n used to align the gradient
to the action component, is a matrix given by
Ri =
[
0ni×n1 · · · 0ni×ni−1 Ini×ni 0ni×ni+1 · · · 0ni×nN
]
. (8)
A. Attack-Resilient Distributed NE Seeking Algorithm Design
From the DoS attack model in the subsection III-B, we consider
sequence-based attacks where the m-th attack is lunched over a
communication channel (i, j). Without loss of generality, suppose
that there exists an infinite sequence k = 0, 1, 2, · · · for intervals
[t2k, t2(k+1)) such that in the absence of DoS attacks, each player
i updates its input ei based on an original communication network
during [t2k, t2k+1), while for each communication channel (i, j)
under DoS attacks during [t2k+1, t2k+2), the attackers interrupt
its information transmission to make original connected commu-
nication network disrupted or totally paralyzed.
To analyze the influence of DoS attacks, we propose an attack-
resilient distributed NE seeking algorithm as
x˙
i = −RTi ▽iJi(x
i) + ei, t ∈ [t2k, t2k+2), k = 0, 1, · · · , (9)
where ei denotes the relative estimated errors under attacks
ei =
{
−κ
∑N
j=1 aij(x
i − xj), t ∈ [t2k, t2k+1),∑N
j=1 a
Ψ(t)
ij (x
j − xi), t ∈ [t2k+1, t2k+2),
(10)
where κ is a positive constant gain to be specified later, and the
a
Ψ(t)
ij , t ∈ [t2k+1, t2k+2), dependent on an attack flag ψ(i, j, t), is
defined as a
Ψ(t)
ij = 0 if ψ(i, j, t) = 1 or −1; otherwise a
Ψ(t)
ij = 1
if ψ(i, j, t) = 0. The expression of ψ(i, j, t) is presented below.
Set the initial value ψ(i, j, t) = 0 for ∀(i, j) ∈ E¯ , and then each
player i updates the attack flag ψ(j, i, t) as follows
1) if player i can receive information from player j at t, then
ψ(i, j, t) = 0 and it sends its information to player j;
2) if player i cannot receive information from player j at t,
then ψ(i, j, t) = 1 and it sends ψ(i, j, t) = 1 to player j;
3) if player i receives ψ(i, j, t) = 1 which means it knows the
attacking of channel (i, j), then denote ψ(i, j, t) = −1 and
send its information to player j.
Remark 4: To facilitate understandings of (10), Fig. 4 shows
the schematic of time sequences with and without DoS attacks.
Intuitively, not all communication networks are secured anytime
in practice, while it is reasonable to secure some original network.
In the presence of DoS attacks, ei in (10) relies on ψ(i, j, t). Each
player updates this attack flag once an attack signal over commu-
nication channels is detected by certain devices or mechanisms.
The attack detection design is beyond the scope of this work.
Remark 5: In the absence of DoS attacks, ei in (10) becomes
ei = −κ
∑N
j=1 aij(x
i − xj), which is a modified version of the
design in [11] that requires a restrictive graph coupling condition
under an undirected graph. In contrast, an adjustable proportional
control gain κ is introduced to enable a natural trade-off between
the control effort and graph connectivity under Assumption 1.
Fig. 4. Schematic of time sequences with and without DoS attacks.
Next, denote the following stacked vectors and matrices
x = col(x1, · · · , xN ), R = diag{R1, · · · ,RN}, (11)
e = col(e1, · · · , eN ), F(x) = col(▽1J1(x
1), · · · ,▽NJN (x
N )).
Combining (9)-(11) gives rise to the closed-loop system under
attacks in the sense of a compact form
x˙ =
{
−RT F(x)− κ(L ⊗ In)x, t ∈ [t2k, t2k+1),
−RT F(x)− (LΨ(t) ⊗ In)x, t ∈ [t2k+1, t2k+2),
(12)
where L is the Laplacian matrix of the original strongly connected
digraph, while LΨ(t) is the Laplacian matrix of various potential
graphs under attacks, and its zero eigenvalues may not be simple
as those graphs can be unconnected under attacks.
5B. Stability Analysis with An Exponential Convergence Rate
Before presenting the main result, we show that in the absence
of attacks, the equilibrium of the system occurs when all players
can reach consensus at the NE.
Proposition 1: Consider the game over the directed commu-
nication graph G¯. Then, under Assumptions 1-3, x˜ = 1N ⊗ x∗ is
the NE of the game on networks in the absence of DoS attacks if
F(x˜) = 0n (or ▽iJi(x˜
i) = 0ni). At the NE, estimated vectors of
all players reach consensus and equal to the NE x∗. Thus, players’
action components coincide with optimal actions (x˜
i
i = x
∗
i ).
Proof: In the absence of DoS attacks, let x˜ be an equilibrium
of the system. Then, we have 0Nn = −RT F(x˜) − κ(L ⊗ In)x˜,
which implies that multiplying both sides by 1TN ⊗ In yields
0n = −(1
T
N ⊗ In)R
T F(x˜)− κ(1TN ⊗ In)(L ⊗ In)x˜. (13)
Since 1TNL = 0
T
Nn under Assumption 1, we obtain 0n = (1
T
N⊗
In)RTF(x˜). Then, it follows from the notations of R and F in
(11) that F(x˜) = 0n. Then, submitting it into (13) gives rise to
(L ⊗ In)x˜ = 0Nn. Hence, there exists certain θ ∈ R
n such that
x˜ = 1N ⊗ θ under Assumption 1. Then, it has F(1N ⊗ θ) = 0n
for each player i ∈ V . Thus, ▽iJi(θi, θ−i) = 0ni . That is, θ is a
unique NE of the game and θ = x∗. Thus, x˜ = 1N ⊗ x∗ and for
i, j ∈ V , we have x˜i = x˜j = x∗ (NE of the game).
Notice that in the presence of DoS attacks, the system becomes
x˙ = −RT F(x)−(LΨ(t)⊗In)x. Due to the fact that the existence
and uniqueness of the NE x∗ are guaranteed under Assumptions
2 and 3, then, following a similar analysis above can give rise to
0n = (1
T
N ⊗ In)R
T F(x˜) − (1TN ⊗ In)(L
Ψ(t) ⊗ In)x˜. However,
the presence of DoS attacks will make 1TNL
Ψ(t) = 0TNn not hold
and then, consensus estimates on the NE cannot be reached under
attacks because there may not have correct information exchange
among all players. Under such a situation, x∗ may not be the NE.
Next, the main task is an explicit analysis of the frequency and
duration of attacks to guarantee x˜i = x˜j = x∗.
Next, we present the main result on the resilient distributed NE
seeking on networks under DoS attacks.
Theorem 1: Under Assumptions 1-3, Problem 1 can be solv-
able for any xi(0) under the proposed resilient distributed opti-
mization algorithm in (9)-(10) provided that for κ > 1
λ2(Lˆ)(
ι2
ε
+ι)
and positive scalars λa, λb, u to be determined later, the following
two attack-related conditions are satisfied:
(1). There exists constants η∗ ∈ (0, λa) and µ > 1 so that Tf
in the attack frequency Definition 2 satisfies the condition:
Tf > T
∗
f = 2 ln(µ)/η
∗, (14)
(2). There exist constants λa, λb > 0 such that Ta in the attack
duration Definition 3 that satisfies the condition:
Ta > T
∗
a = (λa + λb)/(λa − η
∗). (15)
Moreover, the estimated states can converge to the NE with an
exponential convergence rate, i.e.,
||x(t)− x˜||2 ≤ ςe−η(t−t0)||x(t0)− x˜||2, ∀t0 ≥ 0, (16)
where ς is a positive scalar and η = λa− (λa+λb)/Ta−η∗ > 0.
Proof: The proof includes four steps:
Step i): when communication networks do not suffer from DoS
attacks during [t2k, t2k+1), we first show that the NE seeking can
be achieved exponentially under a strongly connected digraph.
Now, we first make a coordinate transformation as
−→
x = (1N ⊗ S)x ∈ R
Nn, S =
1
N
(1TN ⊗ In), (17)
←−
x = (T ⊗ In)x ∈ R
Nn, T = IN −
1
N
(1N1
T
N ). (18)
Then, it follows from (17) that the average estimate of xi can
be described by x¯ = 1
N
∑N
i=1 x
i = 1
N
(1TN ⊗ In)x = Sx. Further,
for any x ∈ RNn, it can be decomposed as x = −→x +←−x with
(−→x )T←−x = 0 and (L ⊗ In)
−→
x = 0Nn under Assumption 1.
For stability analysis, we select the Lyapunov function as
Va(x) =
α
2
(x− x˜)T (x− x˜) =
α
2
(−→x +←−x − x˜)T (−→x +←−x − x˜)
=
1
2
[ −→
x − x˜
←−
x
]T
Pa
[ −→
x − x˜
←−
x
]
, (19)
where Pa = diag{αINn, αINn}, α > 0 is an adjustable constant,
and the fact that (−→x )T←−x = 0 and 1TNT = 0
T
N are used.
The time derivative of Va(x) is expressed as
V˙a(x) = −α(x− x˜)
T [RTF(x) + κ(L ⊗ In)x]. (20)
As 0Nn = −R
TF(x˜)− κ(L⊗ In)x˜, (20) can be expressed as
V˙a(x) = −α(x− x˜)
T [RT (F(x)−F(x˜))+κ(L⊗In)(x− x˜)]. (21)
In light of x˜ = 1N ⊗ x∗, x =
−→
x +←−x , and (L⊗ In)
−→
x = 0Nn
under Assumption 1, then the first term in (21) becomes
− (x − x˜)TRT [F(x)− F(x˜)] (22)
= −(←−x )TRT [F(x)− F(−→x )]− (←−x )TRT [F(−→x )− F(x˜)]
− (−→x − x˜)TRT [F(x)− F(−→x )]− (−→x − x˜)TRT [F(−→x )− F(x˜)].
It follows from Assumption 3 that according to the ιF -Lipschitz
continuity of F , it yields that ‖F (x)−F (−→x )‖ ≤ ιF ‖
←−
x ‖. Further,
‖F(x) − F(−→x )‖ ≤ ιF‖
←−
x ‖ for certain scalar ιF > 0. In addition,
since ‖RT ‖ = 1, F(−→x ) = F (x¯), and F(x˜) = F (x∗) = 0,
−(←−x )TRT [F(−→x )− F(x˜)] = −(←−x )TRT (F (x¯)− F (x∗))
≤ ιF ‖
←−
x ‖‖x¯− x∗‖, (23)
−(−→x − x˜)TRT [F(x)− F(−→x )] = −(x¯− x∗)T (F(x)− F(−→x ))
≤ ιF‖x¯− x
∗‖‖←−x ‖, (24)
where the fact that R−→x = x¯ and Rx˜ = x∗ is used, and exploiting
the ε-strong monotonicity of F , we can obtain
− (−→x − x˜)TRT [F(−→x )− F(x˜)]
= −(x¯− x∗)T (F (x¯)− F (x∗)) ≤ −ε‖x¯− x∗‖2. (25)
In addition, the second term in (21) can be rewritten as
− (x− x˜)T (L ⊗ In)(x− x˜) = −(
−→
x +←−x )T (L ⊗ In)(
−→
x +←−x )
= −
1
2
←−
x T [(LT + L)⊗ In]
←−
x ≤ −λ2(Lˆ)‖
←−
x ‖2, (26)
where λ2(Lˆ) is a minimal positive eigenvalue of Lˆ =
1
2 (L
T +L).
Let ι = max{ιF , ιF}. Substituting (23)-(26) into (21) gives
V˙a(x) ≤ −α{(κλ2(Lˆ)− ι)‖
←−
x ‖2 + ε‖x¯− x∗‖2 − 2ι‖←−x ‖‖x¯− x∗‖}
= −α
[
‖x¯− x∗‖
‖←−x ‖
]T [
ε −ι
−ι κλ2(Lˆ)− ι
] [
‖x¯− x∗‖
‖←−x ‖
]
,
= −
1
2
[
‖−→x − x˜‖
‖←−x ‖
]T
Qa
[
‖−→x − x˜‖
‖←−x ‖
]
, (27)
6where the fact that ‖x¯−x∗‖ = 1√
N
‖−→x − x˜‖ is used and Qa = 2α[
ε
N
− ι√
N
− ι√
N
κλ2(Lˆ)− ι
]
> 0 if κ > 1
λ2(Lˆ) (
ι2
ε
+ ι).
Thus, it concludes that there exists positive scalars α, ǫ, ι, and
a matrix Pa, so that for the Lyapunov function in (19),
Va(x) =
1
2
χTPaχ⇒ V˙a(x) ≤ −λaVa(x), t ∈ [t2k, t2k+1), (28)
where χ = col(−→x − x˜,←−x ) and λa = λmin(Qa)/λmax(Pa) > 0.
Step ii): when considering the presence of DoS attacks during
[t2k+1, t2(k+1)), we select the Lyapunov function as
Vb(x) =
β
2
(x− x˜)T (x− x˜) =
1
2
χTPbχ, (29)
where Pb = diag{βINn, βINn}, β 6= α is a positive constant.
In the presence of DoS attacks, x˙ = −RT F(x)−(LΨ(t)⊗In)x
by (12). Since x∗ is the unique NE, 0Nn = −RT F(x˜)−(LΨ(t)⊗
In)x˜. By adding this equation, it follows from (22)-(27) that the
time derivative of Vb(x) can be described by
V˙b(x) = −β(x− x˜)
T [RT (F(x)− F(x˜)) + (LΨ(t) ⊗ In)(x− x˜)]
≤ −β
[
‖x¯− x∗‖
‖←−x ‖
]T [
ε −ι
−ι −ι
] [
‖x¯− x∗‖
‖←−x ‖
]
− β(−→x − x˜+←−x )T (LΨ(t) ⊗ In)(
−→
x − x˜+←−x )
≤ β
[
‖−→x − x˜‖
‖←−x ‖
]T [ − ε
N
ι√
N
ι√
N
ι
][
‖−→x − x˜‖
‖←−x ‖
]
+ β‖LΨ(t)‖
[
‖−→x − x˜‖
‖←−x ‖
]T [
‖−→x − x˜‖
‖←−x ‖
]
=
1
2
[
‖−→x − x˜‖
‖←−x ‖
]T
Qb
[
‖−→x − x˜‖
‖←−x ‖
]
(30)
where Qb = 2β
[
c− ε
N
c+ ι√
N
c+ ι√
N
c+ ι
]
with c = ‖LΨ(t)‖, may
have both positive and negative eigenvalues.
Thus, it concludes that there exists positive scalars β, ǫ, ι, and
a matrix Pb, so that for the Lyapunov function in (29),
Vb(x) =
1
2
χTPbχ⇒ V˙b(x) ≤ λbVb(x), t ∈ [t2k+1, t2k+2), (31)
where λa = σmax(Qb)/λmin(Pb) > 0 and σmax(Qb) denotes the
maximum singular value of Qb.
Step iii): we analyze the exponential convergence of the closed-
loop system from a switching perspective [21]–[25].
Let δ(t) ∈ {a, b} be a switching signal. Then, we can choose
V (t) =
{
Va(x), if t ∈ [t2k, t2k+1),
Vb(x), if t ∈ [t2k+1, t2k+2),
(32)
where Va(x) and Vb(x) are defined in (19) and (29), respectively.
Suppose that Va is activated in [t2k, t2k+1), while Vb is acti-
vated in [t2k+1, t2k+2). Then, by (28) and (31), we have
V (t) ≤
{
e−λa(t−t2k)Va(t2k), if t ∈ [t2k, t2k+1),
eλb(t−t2k+1)Vb(t2k+1), if t ∈ [t2k+1, t2k+2).
(33)
The closed-loop system is switched at t = t+2k or t = t
+
2k+1.
Let µ = max{λmax(Pa)/λmin(Pb), λmax(Pb)/λmin(Pa)} > 1,
and next, we discuss the following two cases:
Case a): If t ∈ [t2k, t2k+1), it follows from (33) that
V (t) ≤ e−λa(t−t2k)Va(t2k) ≤ µe−λa(t−t2k)Vb(t−2k)
≤ µe−λa(t−t2k)[eλb(t2k−t2k−1)Vb(t2k−1)]
≤ µe−λa(t−t2k)eλb(t2k−t2k−1)[µVa(t−2k−1)]
= µ2e−λa(t−t2k)eλb(t2k−t2k−1)Va(t−2k−1)
≤ µ2e−λa(t−t2k)eλb(t2k−t2k−1)[e−λa(t2k−1−t2k−2)Va(t2k−2)]
≤ · · ·
≤ µ2ke−λa|Ξs(t0,t)|eλb|Ξa(t0,t)|Va(t0). (34)
Case b): If t ∈ [t2k+1, t2(k+1)), it follows from (33) that
V (t) ≤ eλb(t−t2k+1)Vb(t2k+1) ≤ µeλb(t−t2k+1)Va(t−2k+1)
≤ µeλb(t−t2k+1)[e−λa(t2k+1−t2k)Va(t2k)
≤ µeλb(t−t2k+1)e−λa(t2k+1−t2k)[µVb(t−2k−1)]
≤ µ2eλb(t−t2k+1)e−λa(t2k+1−t2k)[eλb(t2k−1−t2k−2)Vb(t2k−2)]
≤ · · ·
≤ µ2k+1e−λa|Ξs(t0,t)|eλb|Ξa(t0,t)|Va(t0). (35)
Step iv): we consider bounds on attack frequency and duration.
Notice that Na(t0, t) = k for t ∈ [t2k, t2k+1) and k + 1 for
t ∈ [t2k+1, t2(k+1)). Thus, for ∀t ≥ t0, by (34) and (35),
V (t) ≤ µ2Na(t0,t)e−λa|Ξs(t0,t)|eλb|Ξa(t0,t)|V (t0). (36)
Notice that for all t ≥ t0, |Ξs(t0, t)| = t− t0 − |Ξa(t0, t)| and
|Ξa(t0, t)| ≤ T0 + (t− t0)/Ta by Definition 3. Thus, we have
− λa(t− t0 − |Ξa(t0, t)|) + λb|Ξa(t0, t)|
= −λa(t− t0) + (λa + λb)|Ξa(t0, t)|
≤ −λa(t− t0) + (λa + λb)[T0 + (t− t0)/Ta]. (37)
Next, substituting (37) into (36) yields
V (t) ≤ µ2Na(t0,t)e−λa(t−t0−|Ξa(t0,t)|)eλb|Ξa(t0,t)|V (t0) (38)
≤ e(λa+λb)T0e−λa(t−t0)e
(λa+λb)
τa
(t−t0)e2 ln(µ)Na(t0,t)V (t0).
By exploiting the attack condition in (14), we can have
2 ln(µ)Na(t0, t) ≤ 2 ln(µ)N0 + η
∗(t− t0). (39)
Let η = λa− (λa+λb)/Ta− η
∗ > 0. Based on another attack
condition in (15), and using (39), we can rewrite (38) as
V (t) ≤ e(λa+λb)T0+2 ln(µ)N0 e−η(t−t0)V (t0). (40)
Further, it follows from (19), (29), and (40) that
||χ(t)||2 ≤ ςe−η(t−t0)||χ(t0)||2, (41)
where ς = e(λa+λb)T0+2 ln(µ)ςa/ςb, ςa = max{λmax(Pa), λmax(
Pb)}, and ςb = min{λmin(Pa), λmin(Pb)}.
Therefore, it follows from (41) that all estimate states
−→
x −x˜ and
←−
x are bounded, and converge to zero exponentially. Furthermore,
limt→∞(
−→
x − x˜) = 0Nn and limt→∞
←−
x = 0Nn. Then, according
to the coordinate transformation
−→
x ,
←−
x in (17) and (18), and by
using the fact that x = −→x +←−x , we can obtain that x exponentially
converges to x˜ = 1⊗ x∗. That is, Problem 1 is solved.
7Remark 6: Theorem 1 presented the main resilient distributed
NE seeking result with an exponential convergence rate η = λa−
(λa + λb)/Ta− η∗. Here, (1− 1Ta )λa is mainly used to measure
the average rate of exponential decay of the stable subsystems,
while λb/Ta isy used to measure the exponential growth rate of
unstable subsystems. The η∗ explains the exponential growth due
to switchings. Note that the convergence rate is not only affected
by λa and λb that rely on the communication topology, number of
players, and control gains, but the attack frequency and duration.
Moreover, the larger values of attack frequency and duration are,
the more active that those attacks are allowed to be.
Notice that in the absence of DoS attacks, Theorem 1 can be
reduced to the following corollary:
Corollary 1: Under Assumptions 1-3, the following distributed
NE seeking algorithm enables all players’ estimated strategies to
exponentially converge to the NE provided κ > ( ι
2
ε
+ ι)/λ2(Lˆ).
x˙
i = −RTi ▽iJi(x
i) + ei, ei = −κ
N∑
j=1
aij(e
i − ej), i ∈ V .
Remark 7: The corollary can cover some existing results (e.g.,
[8], [11]) as special cases. Moreover, it can avoid restrictive graph
coupling conditions in [11] by adding a proportional gain κ, and
remove the use of two-timescale singular perturbation that yields
semi-global convergence in [8], [11]. The design does not require
any initial requirements and allow for a general directed graph.
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, numerical examples are presented to verify the
effectiveness of the proposed NE seeking design. The communi-
cation graph for all players in examples is depicted in Fig. 5, in
which the original strongly connected digraph and the paralyzed
graphs induced by attacks are presented, respectively.
Fig. 5. Communication graph for the players in the examples: (a) original strongly
connected digraph; and (b)-(d) paralyzed graphs under various DoS attacks.
Example 1: (Energy Consumption Game)
In this example, we consider an energy consumption game of
N players for Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC)
system (see [8]), where the cost function of each player i can be
modeled by the following function:
Ji(xi, x−i) = ai(xi − bi)2 +

c N∑
j=1
xj + d

xi, i ∈ V ,
where ai > 0, c > 0, bi and d are constants for i ∈ V . It can
be verified that Assumptions 2 and 3 are satisfied. Throughout
this simulation, let ai = 1, c = 0.1, d = 10 for each player. In
the following simulation, we investigate the effectiveness of the
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Fig. 6. Simulated results of the proposed attack-resilient NE seeking algorithm
in (9)-(10): (a) DoS attacks on various communication channels; (b) all players’
estimated strategies xij(t), i, j ∈ V ; and (c) relative errors of all players’ actions.
proposed resilient distributed NE seeking algorithm in (9)-(10)
from the perspective of network under DoS attacks with several
comparisons with the existing algorithm, controller gain, attack
frequency/duration, network topology and number of players.
A. Resilient Algorithm for Exponential Distributed NE Seeking
We consider five players (N = 5) in the game over a strongly
connected digraph in the absence of attacks and three types of
disconnected digraphs caused by DoS attacks as shown in Fig. 5.
Constants bi for i = 1, · · · , 5, are set to 10, 15, 20, 25, and 30,
respectively. By certain calculation based on those parameters, the
NE is x∗ = col(2.0147, 6.7766, 11.5385, 16.3004, 21.0623) [8].
The initial states are given by xii(0) = col(−2,−4,−6,−8,−10)
and xij(0) = col(15, 10, 5, 0), ∀i 6= j, which are not close to x
∗.
The control gain of algorithm in (10) is set as κ = 10 and the
variable to balance the weight is ω = col(16 ,
2
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 ).
Next, we perform the proposed resilient NE seeking algorithm
in (9)-(10), and simulation results are provided as shown in Fig.
6. In particular, Fig. 6(a) shows the occurrence of DoS attacks,
where attack frequency and duration conditions in Theorem 1 are
satisfied. Fig. 6(b) illustrates all players’ estimate strategies on the
NE x∗, while the relative errors of all players’ actions ‖x− x∗‖/
‖x∗‖ are depicted in Fig. 6(c). As observed, all players’ estimate
strategies reach consensus and converge to the NE exponentially.
B. Algorithm Comparison
In order to make some comparisons, we perform the algorithm
in [11] to further illustrate the proposed algorithm’s effectiveness
under DoS attacks. All simulation environments are set the same
as those in the subsection V-A. It can be observed from Fig. 7 (a)
that in the presence of attacks, the design in [11] cannot guarantee
the exact convergence of all players’ estimates to the NE x∗. In
contrast, Fig. 7 (b) shows the performance of the proposed attack-
resilient algorithm, which can verify the design’s effectiveness.
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Fig. 7. The plot of players’ strategies xi(t) produced by the proposed algorithm
and the algorithm in [16] in the presence of DoS attacks.
C. Performance Analysis of Algorithm
1) Controller gain: we show the influence of control gain κ on
the performance of algorithm, we conduct the proposed algorithm
with the same simulation setting in the subsection V-A, but under
two different gains κ = 1 and κ = 5, respectively. Fig. 8 shows
the plots of players’ strategies and relative errors under different
control gains, which implies that the larger the gain κ, the better
the convergence performance is, which is as analyzed.
2) Number of Player: we increase the number of players to
N = 3, 5, 10 and analyze its influence on the performance of the
proposed algorithm. We set bi = 5i+5 for each i = 1, 2, · · · , N ,
and select a cycle directed graph as the original communication
graph. Fig. 9 depicts the performance of the proposed algorithm
under the different number of players. The algorithm is scalable to
various number of players, and the smaller the number of players,
the better the performance is as expected.
3) Network Topology: in this part, we investigate the influence
of the different original communication topologies on the perfor-
mance of algorithm. As analyzed in the theorem, the larger the
λa, the better convergence performance is. Intuitively, the larger
the nonzero eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix, the larger the λa.
Fig. 10 shows the logarithmic curve of relative errors. As we see,
the performance is better for a graph with more links.
4) Attack Frequency and Duration: we illustrate the influence
of attack frequency and duration on the performance of algorithm.
According to the theorem, the frequency and duration of attacks
have to be constrained to guarantee the convergence of all players’
estimates to the NE. Simulated result is shown in Fig. 11, where
a comparison, when the attack frequency and duration conditions
in (14) and (15) hold and do not not, is provided. As can be seen,
the result is consistent with the analysis in Remark 6.
Example 2: (General Non-Quadratic Game)
In this example, we investigate a more general non-quadratic
game, where the cost functions for each player i are given by
J1(x1, x−1) =
x21
2
+ x1
5∑
j=2
xj , J2(x2, x−2) =
e
x2
2
2
+ x2x4,
J3(x3, x−3) =
x23
2
+ x31, J4(x4, x−4) = ln(e
x4) + x24 + x
3
3,
J5(x5, x−5) = x25 − 5x5 + x
3
1x2 + x3x
4
4, i = 1, · · · , 5. (42)
Next, we perform the proposed algorithm for this non-quadratic
game with the same simulation setting in the subsection V-A. By
the calculation, the NE is x∗ = col(−4.6589, 4.1589, 0,−2, 2.5).
The simulation result is shown in Fig. 12, and as we can see, under
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Fig. 8. The plot of players’ strategies xi and their relative errors ‖x−x∗‖/‖x∗‖
produced by the proposed algorithm in (9)-(10) with different controller gains.
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Fig. 9. Performance of the proposed algorithm (9)-(10) with different players:
(a) the cycle digraph; (b) the relative error; and (c) its logarithmic curve.
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Fig. 10. The logarithmic curve of the relative error produced by the proposed
algorithm (9)-(10) with different network graphs.
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(a) Small attack requency and duration
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Fig. 11. The plot of players’ strategies xi(t) produced by the proposed algorithm:
(a) conditions (14)-(15) hold; (b) conditions (14)-(15) are not satisfied.
attacks, all players’ estimates can reach consensus and converge
to the NE exponentially.
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Fig. 12. Simulated results of the proposed attack-resilient NE seeking algorithm
in (9)-(10): (a) DoS attacks on various communication channels; (b) all players’
estimated strategies xij(t), i, j ∈ V ; and (c) relative errors of all players’ actions.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, an attack-resilient distributed algorithm has been
presented for exponential NE seeking of non-cooperative games,
where all players’ strategies have been updated through a directed
communication network subject to malicious DoS attacks. Under
such an adversary network environment, the exponential conver-
gence of the proposed distributed algorithm has been established
through the explicit analysis of the attack frequency and duration.
Moreover, in the absence of DoS attacks, the corollary has been
provided, which can cover many existing results as special cases.
The effectiveness of the developed approach has been illustrated
by the numerical examples. Further work may consider distributed
NE seeking problems for aggregative games with constraints.
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